Comment If you're defending against one of these old c/s collection cases, plead as a defense §31.006 and 34.001 plus the Leg's violation of its "remedial boundaries" so the Supremes can grant review and decide this issue.

1. §157.263(b)(2) says a cumulative judgment includes "...the balance owed on previously confirmed arrearages...judgment"; however, if such a c/s judgment becomes dormant and not subject to being revived (12 yrs. total), such a judgment is not owing -- it can't be part of the cumulative judgment.
2. The foregoing statement does not apply to an action by the A.G. because §16.061 TCPRC specifically states that §31.006, TCPRC, does not apply to a "right of action by the state" which is the A.G.'s function when suing to collect unpaid c/s (§231.109).

Comment - I've been scratching my head trying to figure out what the Supremes meant in In the Matter of A.D. (73/244) and Sprouse (45 Tx. Sup. Ct. J. 46A) when they declined to rule on whether the judgment dormancy provisions of §31.006 and §34.001, TCPRC, applied to past due c/s. Maybe this is it. Maybe a private atty can't have a cumulative judgment which includes an unrevivable dormant c/s judgment even if the A.G. can. Although one appeals court (Kuykendall, 957/707) says differently, maybe §157.261(a) means what it says (a c/s payment not timely paid constitutes a final judgment for the amount due and owing) so the judgment dormancy rules prevent a obligee (in a private suit) from obtaining a monetary judgment for unpaid c/s that is over 12 yrs. past due. Remember the Supremes in Sprouse said the important question was whether the dormancy provisions apply to past-due c/s payments, not judgments for past due c/s. I don't have the answer but it sure is interesting.

1. In the Interest of CRO and DJO, No. 07-01-0294-CV, not yet published (CA, Amarillo). In '97 H & W divorced in GA and W was awarded custody of the parties' 2 kids. W remarried and moved to Ft. Bend County, TX with H2 and the kids. H moved to FL. In July 2000 W advised H that she, H2 and the kids were moving to Hawaii as H2 had a new job which increased his pay by $50,000/yr. In Aug. 2000 H filed suit in Ft. Bend County requesting that the GA order be modified so as to restrict the kids' domicile to Ft. Bend County. The T/C issued a TRO preventing W from removing the kids outside the T/C's juris. 5 days later H2 moved to Hawaii leaving W home alone with the kids. 3 mos. later H also moved to Ft. Bend and begun seeing his kids more frequently. Everyone is an excellent parent and the Hawaii move wasn't done out of spite. In March, 2001, the T/C entered an order restricting the kids' domicile to Ft. Bend and contiguous counties. W appeals.

   The CA affirmed and focused on the provisions of §153.001 which says that the best interest of the kids and Texas public policy are served if a parent is allowed to keep meaningful, frequent and continuing contact with his/her kids and is able to share the rights and duties of raising (I thought you raise cows but you rear children but this is Texas) his/her kids in a stable environment. Weighing the benefits of moving to Hawaii against the continued contact between H and his kids, the T/C did not abuse its discretion in restricting the kids' domicile to Texas.

2. Echols v. Olivarez, No. 03-01-00410-CV, not yet published (CA, Austin). M and F (unmarried) had a kid in '93. F's paternity was established in '97. M and F were designated as JMCs with M having the right to establish the kid's residence in Texas. M had another child by some other man in 2000 but while she was on maternity leave her job was given to someone else. When she returned to work her employer offered her a new job in Tenn. at a much higher salary so M filed a motion to modify to remove the "Texas only" child restriction. T/C removed the domicile restriction so W could take the Tenn. job. F appealed on the basis that all the evidence indicated that M would substantially benefit by moving to Tenn. but there was no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to show that the move was in the child's best interest.

   The Austin CA also referred to §153.001, but unlike the Amarillo CA it said "...in the context of relocation cases, slavish adherence to such policy ignores the realities of a family that has been dissolved...each parent must establish a separate life. And in today's society, it is unrealistic to expect that any family...will remain in one geographic location for an extended period of time." In a pretty well reasoned opinion, the Austin CA basically held that what's good for mom is what's good for the child and cited Lenz (79/10) for the idea that in relocation cases the child's best interest should be considered in the context of the custodial parent's happiness.

   Comment - As I said, no matter what side you are representing, one of the above cases is going to please you. I also venture to say that if Echols had been heard by the Amarillo CA, M would still be in Texas but if the Austin CA had heard CRO and DJO, the kids would be surfing in the Pacific. Any lawyer who can consistently predict the outcome of relocation cases should quit and start a stock investment firm (he/she probably would have sold Enron short when Skilling quit).