 Gray's Interesting Cases - July 2001
 










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- In the Interest of T.S.S., No. 04-00-00431-CV, not yet published (CA, San Antonio). H & W divorced in '89 with a decree that found that H & W were the parents of their child. In Sept. '99 the parties signed an agreed order whereby the child started living with H and terminated his c/s obligation. While in H's custody, H had the child DNA tested and guess what, H isn't the kid's bio. father so he returned the child to W and filed a termination suit. H said that his attitude toward the child has changed to the extent that it would be in the child's interest to terminate the parent-child relationship. W filed an answer claiming res judicata and collateral estoppel and a motion for S/J. T/C granted the S/J and H appeals.
CA affirmed. Without passing on the issue of res judicata, H is collaterally estopped from revisiting the issue of the child's parentage as H didn't raise that issue during the divorce proceeding.
Comment - Whether by B of R or another proceeding, once a divorce decree is signed whereby H is found to be the kid(s)'s father, the issue can't be re-litigated. Also see Thompson (572/761) which holds that a decree finding that a child was born during the marriage is equivalent to a finding that H is the child's father.
- Henry v. Henry, No. 14-98-01032-CV, not yet published (CA, Houston - 14th). H & W married in '94 when H was working for a large corp. In '96 H's employer began downsizing so it offered a severance package to employees which H took and left his employer. H filed for divorce in '97. At trial the issue was the character of the severance package which had a value of approx. $64,000.00. H testified that the amount of the severance was dependent on his yrs of service, his position and his performance. The corp's documents showed that the severance was offered to 'induce employees to quit voluntarily and the amount paid was to compensate for wages, severance pay, termination pay, expenses, damages and employee benefits'. The T/C divided the $64,000.00 per the Berry formula. W appeals.
Reversed. The $64,000.00 was not a retirement benefit or anything roughly equivalent thereto. The severance package was purely a discretionary payment given to induce employees to quit, thus the $64,000.00 was community property. As such the community property was not divisible per Berry as that relates only to pension plan divisions.
- In re Dryden, No. 13-01-231-CV, not yet published (CA, Corpus Christi). H hadn't paid his c/s for 42 years so W filed a motion to enforce. On 2/21/01, the T/C awarded W a $90,000.00 judgment against H and set specific terms as to how H would pay the judgment (presumably H was also held in contempt, sentenced to jail but the jail term was probated provided he paid W per the installment plan outlined by the T/C to satisfy the $90,000.00 judgment). 31 days later W obtained a writ of execution, garnished H's bank account and filed post-judgment discovery proceedings. H had faithfully followed the T/C's installment payment plan. H (after the T/C's plenary time had expired) filed a motion for protection and a motion to quash all of W's post judgment collection efforts. Following hearing the T/C signed an order on 4/6/01 saying that W can't seek collection of the $90,000.00 judgment if H timely pays per the installment plan set forth in the 2/21/01 order. W files mandamus to set aside the 'no collection' order.
The CA grants the mandamus saying:
- The 4/6/01 order is a nullity as it was signed outside the T/C's plenary time period.
- A T/C has no authority to grant W a monetary judgment and then limit her ability to levy on same to collect the judgment even if the limitation is set forth in the 2/21/01 order.
- The 4/6/01 order isn't a judgment nunc pro tunc.
- The 4/6/01 order isn't a clarifying order because it attempts to substantially change the 2/21/01 order by denying W the right to attempt to collect the $90,000.00 judgment.
Comment - Heck I've drawn and had signed judgments whereby no execution shall be had if the judgment debtor pays off the judgment timely per an installment plan set forth in the judgment. Is this invalid? Probably not because it was done per the agreement of the parties. If a T/C has to grant W a monetary judgment for c/s arrearage (§157.263) but can't restrict W's post judgment collection efforts, what can the T/C do if it wants to protect H's assets from seizure? Merely a suggestion. Normally the greatest motivation for H to pay the judgment is jail time contempt if he doesn't pay and imposition of sentence is within the T/C's sole discretion. The T/C merely says 'Lady, I am awarding you a monetary judgment; however, if you don't agree to limit collection, I am sentencing H for his contempt: (a) an admonishment or (b) a fine of $1.00. If you agree to limit collections, I will sentence him to 6 mos. in jail (punitive) plus he remains in jail until he pays the full accrued c/s; provided, however, his sentence is probated if he timely pays the accrued c/s and judgment per the following installment plan. If he doesn't timely pay, the probation may be revoked and he goes to jail and the limitation on the collections of the monetary judgment is dissolved.' Is this legal? Don't know but its worth a try.
- In the Matter of the Marriage of Nolder, No. 06-00-00152-CV, not yet published (CA, Texarkana). On 6/10/99 H & W signed and filed a Rule 11 agreement in their divorce whereby W was to receive 55% of H's stock options which were to expire on 6/14/99. Unknown to W, H had exercised the options on 6/7/99, sold the stock and then invested the proceeds in other stocks, the value of which had sky rocketed. The T/C then signed a divorce decree awarding W 55% of the cash value of the options. When W found out about H's 'hidden sale and subsequent investment', she filed a motion to modify the decree (I assume this was done within 30 days of the signing of the decree) whereby she would received 55% of the value of the options and 100% of the income, interest, gains and increases of the 55% value which was subsequently invested by H. T/C granted the modification. H appeals claiming that the T/C can't vary the terms of the parties Rule 11 agreement.
CA affirms. When H & W signed the Rule 11 agreement, 55% of the stock options belong to W so H held same in a constructive trust for W's benefit. Equitably W should receive, at her option; (a) 55% of the option proceeds at the time of sale or (b) 55% of the value of the stock H purchased with the proceeds of the stock option sale.
Comment - Keep emphasizing the word 'equitable' because this opinion violates all of the case law on the T/C's ability to vary the terms of the parties' Rule 11 agreement. Of course no one discussed the fact that the Rule 11 agreement purported to divide non-existing assets (the options had been exercised at the time the Rule 11 agreement was signed). Maybe a Rule 11 agreement can be varied if equity, as opposed to the law, dictates.
- Samara v. Samara, No. 01-00-00494-CV, not yet published (CA, Houston - 1st). In a divorce suit, a child custody dispute arose so the T/C appointed X as the children's atty and guardian ad litem. X later discovered that she was in a conflict situation so she, pursuant to §107.002(f), requested the T/C to remove her as the guardian ad litem (GAL) but retain her as atty ad litem (AAL). A lot of these facts are not in the opinion but I obtained them from various attys associated with the case. Apparently one of the kids wanted to live with W which X realized was not necessarily in the kid's best interest hence the conflict between being both the AAL and the GAL. The T/C then appointed a non-atty Y as the GAL. The GAL then petitioned the T/C to appoint her an atty so Z was appointed as Y's atty. Everyone ultimately signed a Rule 11 agreement on custody, etc. but apparently there was no agreement on payment of Z's atty fees. The T/C signed a judgment awarding atty fees to Z so H appealed.
CA reversed as to Z's atty fees saying:
- Rule 173 doesn't authorize a T/C to appoint an atty for a GAL - Gee I wonder what the F/C says since this is a divorce - SAPCR case, not a car wreck.
- The GAL doesn't need an atty because the AAL is already representing the kids. Well there must be some problem or the AAL wouldn't have found a conflict.
- T/C's don't have the inherent power to appoint an atty for a GAL - citing two cases which do not involve appointing attys for the ultimate benefit of kids in a custody dispute.
- If the GAL needed legal advise she should ask the AAL - remember X has already found a conflict between being the AAL and the GAL so now X is supposed to advise Y when a conflict has already been established? Does the term 'ethics' ring a bell?
- If Y isn't satisfied with X, she should have requested the T/C to appoint a new AAL. Remember Y is a non-lawyer so I'm sure she's aware of this option and knows how to file a removal motion.
Comment - This opinion is poorly written in that it doesn't give the underlying facts and demonstrates the CA's misunderstanding of the differences between an AAL and a GAL in a custody dispute. Additionally the T/C added salt to the wounds by appointing a non-atty as a GAL when the T/C already knew there were problems when X advised that she was in a conflict position. §107.014 imposes on an AAL the duty to represent the kid's interest, i.e. do what the kid wants to do whereas §107.015 imposes on a GAL the duty to represent the kid's best interest which may not be what the kid wants. The two duties are not necessarily the same as evidenced by §107.002(f) which recognizes that a conflict may arise between AAL and GAL duties. An excellent paper on the differences between the AAL and the GAL is Jack Sampson's piece in the 1989 Advanced Family Law Course entitled Representing a Child as an Attorney Ad Litem versus a Guardian Ad Litem. Admittedly the F/C makes no provisions for awarding fees to GAL but if a non-atty GAL needs an atty, the T/C should appoint one and that atty should be paid. If the T/C has no inherent power to so do (and I've found no cases directly on point), the F/C should be amended to grant that authority. All in all, this case is bad law or if legally correct, its morally wrong.
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