The CA said YES holding that since the T/C had the authority to order H's estate liable for c/s after his death, it also had the authority to order H to maintain the $250,000 policy until his c/s obligation ceased.

Comment - That's quite a leap of logic. I can't find anything in the F/C that authorizes this but if you want such an order, here's your case law. Apparently this policy was already in existence but what if there wasn't one? Can the T/C order H to obtain one? I assume the premiums are additional c/s so does such an order exceed the c/s guidelines? What if the policy is a term policy that expires in a few years when H is 50 and the ins. premium to renew is sky high or H is uninsurable? Can H have a decreasing insured amount to match his decreased c/s obligation so when he only owes $1700 in c/s he doesn't have to secure that with ins. that's 147 times that which is owed? Would any of this had happened if this wasn't a default case?

Affirmed. Even tho the juvie master acted as if she was an A.J. under the F/C, she isn't . The Govt. Code is different from the F/C in that: (1) The is no right of appeal from a juvie master's order to the "referring ct." and (2) There is no time limit as to when the "referring ct" may sign a final order approving the master's report, i.e. it can be done 2 seconds after the juvie master renders. Even though the juvie master totally mislead g.p. -- tough luck.

Comment - I freely admit that I know nothing about the Govt. Code regarding juvie masters in Harris County (and don't want to). If you have a termination case in a Harris County Juvenile Ct., read the Govt. Code carefully and pay a jury fee. And parental rights in termination cases are constitutionally protected -- yea, right.

Reversed. The c/s interest statute says it applies to c/s due and owing after 9/1/91. Since the $13,000 in accrued c/s was due and owing as of 9/1/91, that am=t bears interest from 9/1/91 until date of payment.

The State filed mandamus which was granted. Where the petitioning party and state (Ariz.) satisfies all of the requirements of the ICJ, the asylum state (Texas) shall order the child returned. This is mandatory and there is no discretion B there is a ministerial duty to return the child. Best interest of the child is not a consideration.

Comment - Shades of Wells Stewart and the habeas corpus cases.

The Ct. of Crim. Apps. ruled that criminal venue is in either County A or B B your choice.

Reversed. Normally the amount of c/s set by the T/C is not disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. In this case there was no evidence of H's net resources so it is presumed he earns minimum wage for a 40 hour week per §154.068 ($5.25/hr, $210/wk or $903/mo. gross with a net monthly of approx. $805). The c/s guidelines say H owes 30% of $805/mo. or $241/mo. in c/s. Obviously, $1,000 is way in excess of $241/mo. so the T/C had to make the findings required under §154.130(b). But wait. H didn't request such findings per §154.130(a) so he waived the right to have the T/C make such findings justifying the variance above the c/s guidelines. Nope. §154.130(a)(3) requires the T/C to make the c/s findings, even if the obligor doesn't request same, whenever the ordered c/s "varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines."

Comment - What always amazes me is how can W's atty. go to trial and not present any evidence of H's income? A 2nd bit of amazement is how can a T/C set c/s without any evidence of the obligor's net resources other than using minimum wage? I guess I'm just naive.

CA affirmed. The MSA did not say who was to pay the refinancing costs so the T/C has the right to enter orders on who assumes such costs as a part of the just and right division of the parties' estate.

Comment - We have all (or at least me) believed that a T/C can enforce a MSA as written and still try any issue not settled by the MSA provided that the T/C's ruling doesn't vary the terms of the MSA. Well here's a case that confirms that. Seems to me though, the easiest way to handle this is do what I do. In every MSA, I provide that any matter/issue not resolved by the MSA will be resolved by the mediator in a arbitration proceeding and the cost thereof will be paid 50/50. It's a heck of a lot faster than waiting for a trial date.

Affirmed. The A.G. doesn't have sovereign immunity; a declaratory action of this type is permissible and the A.G. should be sanctioned. The A.G. argued that he couldn't be sanctioned under Rule 13 as the sanction order doesn't state any facts evidencing good cause for such sanctions. The CA said the T/C's written findings and conclusions were sufficient and such findings don't have to be in the sanction order itself. The A.G. then argued that the adm. wage w/holding writ wasn't a pleading to support a Rule 13 sanction. Nope. Rule 13 says "pleading, motion or other paper" thus the wage w/holding writ was certainly an "other paper". The A.G. then argued that if he receives a report from the c/s office of an arrearage, he has no obligation to ensure that such report is accurate thus the filing of the wage w/holding writ couldn't be in bad faith and groundless. Bologna. "Because the A.G. is empowered to issue a writ of w/holding without judicial oversight, it has a corresponding obligation to ensure that an arrearage exists and the arrearage amount is accurate. The A.G.'s filing...without any effort to verify...,without looking at the divorce decree, without the former wife seeking the A.G.'s assistance or claiming that H was in arrears, and the A.G.'s refusal to w/draw the writ after...being presented with evidence that H was not in arrears can be described in no other terms except groundless and in bad faith."

Comment - Oh my God -- the A.G. has to be fair. This can't be the law. Oh my God -- the A.G. has the duty to investigate the accuracy of a claimed c/s arrearage before taking enforcement actions. This can't be the law. Well it is so maybe if our T/C's start popping the A.G. with heavier and heavier sanctions, this abuse will stop or at least slow down. And thank you A.G. for appealing this case so we have a published opinion we can use to sanction you for your customary abusive, arbitrary, arrogant, unjust, and thoughtless actions. Twits.

The CA modified the judgment deleting any characterization of atty fees as c/s. §106.001, et seq, allows the award of the atty fees in any SAPCR action; however, such fees are only enforceable as a judgment for debt. The only time an atty fee judgment can be rendered as c/s is when those fees are incurred to enforce a c/s obligation and that is only because §157.167 specifically says so. Since the fees in this case were not related to c/s enforcement, any judgment for such fees can not be classified as c/s.

Comment - WOW. I remember Ex parte Wagner (905/799) where atty fees incurred in a paternity case were collectible as c/s but according to this case, Wagner is wrong. Although the Uniform Parentage Act (§160.001, et ux) allows the award of atty fees (§160.636), it doesn't say they are collectable as c/s. There are several cases out there that imply or actually say that the portion of attys in a divorce case attributable to the establishment of c/s are collectable as c/s. I think that Moers is probably correct but the CA never heard from the Appellees as they didn't file responsive briefs per their client's instructions. If you are an ad litem, brush up on TRCP 143 to rule someone for costs. If you are the atty for one of the parties, make sure you get paid in advance or confirm that the other side is not even close to being judgment proof. If you don't do this, you are working for free plus you still have the malpractice liability. Ain't the law grand?

Affirmed. Rule 39 requires the joinder of any party who has an interest in the subject of the case. Since the agreed order gave g.p. possession of the kids at a time when H was to have possession under the divorce SPO and H was a JMC of the kids, H should have been a party to the original suit. Since he wasn't a party, the agreed order is void.

Comment - For the life of me, I can't understand how g.p. ever thought they could get possession of the kids over the objection of H or W since the Corpus CA had already ruled in E.C. Jr. & S.C. v. Grayson (28 SW3d 825) that the g.p. access statute (§153.433) only authorizes "access" meaning cards, letters & telephone calls and not physical possession of the kids.

W filed mandamus which was granted. Since the temp. orders expired with H's death, one way Texas would have juris. in this case as initial custody suit is where Texas is the kid's home state. §152.102(7) of the UCCJAE requires a parent or person acting as a parent to have possession of the child 6 mos. immediately preceding the filing of the custody suit. G.p., even if you assume that they were "acting as parents," filed suit in Aug. '01 but the kids left Texas in April '01 so no 6 mos. residency prior to filing. What is the kids' home state? They don't have one as they had not resided in N.Y. for 6 mos. prior to the Aug. filing. Where there is no home state, you have to look at the state which has the most significant connection with the kids and there is substantial evidence in that state relating to the kids' best interest (§152.201). Seems that would be Texas since they lived here from birth to April '01 but §152.201 has the additional requirement that the custody suit has to be filed by a parent or person acting as a parent. §152.102 (13) defines a "person acting as a parent" as a person who has had the physical custody of the child for 6 consecutive mos. prior to filing suit. G.p. only had the kids for 3 mos. (Jan. to April). Since g.p. can't qualify as a "person acting as a parent," the significant connection portion of the UCCJEA doesn't apply.

Affirmed. The CA found that J.W. wasn't adequately represented in the divorce proceeding in which his paternity was adjudicated (The CA doesn't give any reason for this pronouncement -- it just is) thus the divorce paternity finding isn't binding on J.W. so he can sue X for paternity.

Comment - Seems to me that the Supremes' opinion in Dreyer v. Greene, 871/697, knocks J.W. out of the box and the Dallas CA's attempt to distinguish Dreyer is down right pathetic but we'll never know unless X appeals. Maybe all of this is a tempest in a teapot as situations like this can't arise after 6/14/01 when the Uniform Parentage Act (§160.001, et seq) came into effect.