Houston Bar Association - Family Law Section

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Family Law & Personal Injury

Your Family Law Case Does Not Exist in a Vacuum

Prepared for the Houston Bar Association
Family Law Section
September, 1998

Jeff E. Rusk
Shields & Rusk, P.C.
910 Lavaca
Austin, TX 78701
Tel: 512-476-7600
Fax: 512-476-7731
www.shields-rusk.com
info@shields-rusk.com
Susan Myres
Pollicoff, Smith, Myres
   & Remels, L.L.P
One Greenway Plaza
Suite 300
Houston, TX 77046
Tel: 713-622-6866
Fax: 713-622-5905
Lee Ann Smith
Pollicoff, Smith, Myres
   & Remels, L.L.P
One Greenway Plaza
Suite 300
Houston, TX 77046
Tel: 713-622-6866
Fax: 713-622-5905

Personal Injury and Family Law - Outline of Issues

I. Questions to be addressed

When a person is injured and there is a cause of action for those injuries the questions a family lawyer must answer with the help of their favorite P.I. attorney include:

II. General Rule

The general rule regarding the character of personal injury damages is found in Texas Family Code § 3.001
"A spouse's separate property consists of:
  1. the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;
  2. the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage."

III. Types of Damages in a Personal Injury Action

There is probably an unlimited number of types of damages in personal injury actions. In Section 43.40 of the Texas Family Law Services you can find a listing of some of the damages that can be awarded. I have prepared the following chart of likely property characterizations depending on when the injury occurred and what period of time the damages cover. The numbers within the chart refer to the cases discussed. You are cautioned to not rely solely on this chart or the cases because of the fact intensive nature of these cases and the propensity of our current courts to appear to "modify" res judicata.
ELEMENTS OF
DAMAGES
BEFORE MARRIAGE
DAMAGES
DURING MARRIAGE
DAMAGES
AFTER MARRIAGE
DAMAGES
Past medical expenses for doctors, hospitals, etc. s.p.
if paid for b/f marriage
c.p. (4) s.p
Future medical expenses s.p. c.p./s.p. (4) s.p.
Past actual loss of wages s.p.(5) c.p. if wages lost were to have been earned during marriage(5) s.p. (5)
Past loss of vocational skill s.p. ? s.p.
Past loss of capacity to earn increased wages s.p. c.p.(3), (17) ?(3), (17)
Past loss of profits or net income by person in business s.p. c.p. ?
Future loss of wages s.p. c.p. ?
Future loss of vocational skill s.p. c.p. ?
Future loss of profits or income from person in business s.p. c.p. ?
Cost of hiring a substitute or assistant s.p. c.p. ?
Cost of hiring home care attendants s.p. c.p. ?
Cost of occupational therapy or training s.p. c.p. ?
Cost of special equipment and devices s.p. c.p. ?
Past and future pain and suffering from physical injuries s.p.(2) s.p.(2) s.p.(2)
Mental Anguish and associated symptoms s.p.(2) s.p.(2) s.p.(2)
Sexual Dysfunction/Loss of reproductive capacity s.p. ? ?
Past and future enjoyment of life s.p. ? ?
Punitive/Exemplary Damages s.p. ?(9), (10) ?(9), (10)
Prejudgment interest s.p. c.p. %?
Litigation fees and costs s.p. ? ?
HEIRS OR SPOUSES' POSSIBLE DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO SPOUSE OR CHILD
Loss of consortium n/a s.p.(6) s.p.
Loss of household services of spouse n/a c.p.(5) ?(5)
Parent's loss of minor's services n/a s.p.(7) s.p.(7)depends on divorce decree terms
Loss of companionship of decedent n/a s.p.(8) s.p.(8)
Mental anguish of survivors n/a s.p. s.p.
Funeral and burial expenses n/a c.p. s.p.
c.p.=community property
s.p.=separate property

IV. Types of Personal Injury Actions

V. Torts Between Spouses

  1. No Interspousal Immunity
    Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987)(19)
    - before marriage W was injured on motorcycle that H was driving; after marriage W sued H for various causes of action including negligence; court abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity as to any cause of action.

  2. Innocent Spouses/Tortfeasing Spouses
    Murphy v. Texas Farmers, Inc., No. 01-97-00100-CV, WL 224033 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 1998)(12)
    - Innocent co-insured whose spouse burned property was entitled to insurance for her half of community property that was divided by partition agreement after the fire, even though she learned of the arson after the fire.

    Traveler's Companies v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.App. - Amarillo 1992, no writ)(13)
    - Although W did not own personal property of corporation which was destroyed by H's arson, her ownership of one half of corporate stock vested her with insurable interest in property, and this interest was specifically retained by her as separate property by virtue of divorce decree.

  3. No independent Fraud Actions against the Community
    Schlueter v. Schlueter, No. 96-1091 Tex. July 3, 1998)(20)
    - motion for rehearing pending. The Supreme Court has found the 'just and right' division standard allows redress for a spouse's fraud with a disproportionate division of community assets, spouses may no longer bring a cause of action for fraud on the community.

  4. Alienation of Affections/Interference with Familial Relations
    These actions were abolished per § 1.107
    Helena Laboratories Corp. v. Snyder, 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex 1994)21
    - There is no cause of action for negligent interference with a familial relationship despite the fact that the elements of this action look a lot like loss of consortium. But if you cannot sue the spouse for the action would it be fair to sue the employer for the same damages?

    Stites v. Gillum, 872 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)(22)
    - W filed action against third party claiming 'Interference with Familial Relationship'; held that the action was an action for 'Alienation of Affections' couched in other terms and sanctioned W's attorney.

  5. No Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
    Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex 1993) (24)
    - The Supreme Court has decided that there is only one tort that you cannot recover from if it is committed with mere negligence (i.e. where there might be some insurance coverage). In the family law context you might 'recover' for those actions when you include those factors in your pleadings and proof for emotional and physical cruelty for a disproportionate division.

  6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Allowed in Divorce Action
    Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)(25)
    - tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is viable n Texas; Elements are that defendant acted recklessly or intentionally, that conduct was extreme and outrageous, that actions of defendant caused plaintiff emotional distress, and that emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was severe.

    Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993)(24)
    - H sued W in divorce suit for her outrageous behavior; judgment for $13,000 affirmed;
    -recovery is separate property of injured spouse; separate debt of tortfeasing spouse.

VI. Joinder of Tort and Divorce

  1. Joinder is permitted but not required
    Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)(24)
    - cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be brought in divorce proceeding; tort and divorce should be resolved in same proceeding; and court may not consider same tortious acts when dividing marital estate.

  2. Res Judicata may apply if not joined
    Brinkman v. Brinkman, 966 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 1998, no writ)(26)
    - W claimed physical cruelty to support disproportionate division and remedies at temporary orders; could not later file suit for assault after the divorce.

VII. Practical Issues in Allocation of Proceeds

Finding of Separate Character leads to Reversals
Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.App. - Beaumont 1992, no writ)(27)
- H injured during marriage; received lump sum award. The Court of Appeals held that in subsequent divorce action all of the proceeds were community because there was no allocation which could be used to characterize the award as separate.

Moreno v. Alejandro, 775 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 1989, writ denied)(28)
- in a post divorce partition (now it would be a post divorce division action) of the P.I. suit; the court looked at the language of the pleadings and the judgment to determine the character of the proceeds. H asked for medical expenses and lost earning capacity therefore at least some portion of the judgment was community and could belong to the wife. H had burden of proof.

Equity/Fair and Just Division of Community Asset Affirmed
Huls v. Huls, 616 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ)(29)
- W was permanently injured during marriage and received a lump sum settlement which did not allocate which part of the settlement was separate or community property; court held the entire settlement community and compensated by a disproportionate division of community estate in W's favor.

Saunders v. Saunders, UNPUBLISHED OPINION, (Tex.APp. - Corpus Christi 1989)(30)
- H injured during marriage; language of annuity settlement included both H & W; no tracing available to characterize - held that all should be community and equity will be served by disproportionate division of community estate significantly in H's favor.

Evidence to Review and Present

VIII Summary

Do not presume that prior case law will apply to different facts. Do not presume that prior case law will not change. Do not presume that statutes mean what they say. Analyze the underlying facts of your case to be as creative as you need to be to assist your client.


EXAMPLES:

  1. Injury before marriage:

    Your client was injured in a car accident in 1995, and got married in 1996. In 1997 her claim arising from the accident resulted in a settlement, which included damages for pain and suffering, lost earnings, and medical expenses.

    It's now 1998, and she comes to you to represent her in her divorce. What do you tell her about the division of the 1997 settlement?

    Answer: The damages for pain and suffering are clearly her separate property, regardless of when the accident occurred or when she received a settlement.

    To the extent that her recovery for lost earnings relates to periods of time during the marriage, that amount would probably be considered community property. Obviously, recovery for earnings lost before or after marriage would be separate property.

    To the extent community resources were user to pay medical bills during marriage, the community would have a claim for reimbursement. However, if medical bills simply accumulated pursuant to letters of protection, there would be no harm to the community, and thus no claim for reimbursement.

  2. Recovery after divorce:

    Your client was injured in an auto accident during her marriage. You now represent her in her divorce, and her claim arising from the accident is still pending.

    How do you treat her claim?

    Answer: Any recovery for her disfigurement or pain and suffering will be her separate property, regardless of when the accident occurred or when she receives a settlement.

    The community has a claim for any wages lost during the marriage, as well as a claim for medical expenses incurred during the marriage.

II. Loss of Consortium

When someone is injured in an accident, their spouse may have a claim for loss of consortium. That claim is the separate property of the spouse claiming loss of consortium. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex 1978); Osborn v. Osborn, 961 S.W.2d 408, 414 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied).

The existence of this claim, or potential claim, may complicate the settlement of a personal injury case. The defendant's insurer may require both spouses to sign a release, even though claims have been pursued mainly on behalf of only one spouse.

A child also has a right to recover for loss of consortium when a parent suffers a serious, permanent and disabling injury. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 462, 465-66. There is no such cause of action, however, for siblings or stepparents. Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 41 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 562 (March 19.1998).

Examples:

  1. Release signed by only one spouse:

    Husband is injured in a car accident with Bell. Three months later, Husband settles his claim against Bell for $5,000 and signs a release.

    One year later, Husband suffers a grand mal seizure, and subsequently loses his job as a heavy equipment operator. He and his wife then sue Bell, claiming Husband's seizure disorder was caused by the accident.

    Result: Judgment against Husband as a matter of law based on the release. Wife, however, still has a viable, independent claim for loss of consortium, because she did not sign the release. Crockett v. Bell, 909 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.App - Houston [14th dist.] 1995, no writ).

    Note that Wife's recovery for loss of consortium will be reduced by any percentage of responsibility allocated to Husband. Id. at 75 (citing Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex 1980)).

  2. Signature forged by spouse:

    You represent Husband on an auto accident claim, and you include a claim on Wife's behalf for loss of consortium. When the case settles, you send the release to Husband, and he sends it back with signatures for both him and his Wife.

    Months later, you get an angry call from Wife, who has recently separated from Husband. She informs you that Husband forged her signature on the release. She demands a cop of the release so that she can forward it to her divorce lawyer.

    What do you tell Wife?

      Husband was the one who sought your services, so he was the client, and matters relating to his claim are subject to the attorney-client privilege.

    • You plead the Fifth Amendment

    • You will give her the release, because Husband and Wife were joint clients.

    Answer: c. Because the suit included a consortium claim on Wife's behalf, Husband and Wife were joint clients. This situation was addressed in Philadelphia Ethics Opinion 97-15, reported in the August 1998 ABA Journal, p. 90.